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SPORTS ON THE SUPERSTATIONS: THE
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS
THOMAS JOSEPH CRYAN* and JAMES S. CRANE**
As the sports industries continue to grow during the next cen-
tury, television will be the force which will drive this growth. The
television industry has been a dynamic, evolving, and flexible insti-
tution during its short, fifty year history. Constantly thirsting for
the new technology which will broaden its market, the television
industry is constantly creating new levels of marketing in an at-
tempt to generate additional revenue. Some of the developments
within the industry which have ushered in this new era are cable
television, pay television, and video cassettes.
In the process of providing the consumer with desirable en-
tertainment, the television industry has found that the American
public has a seemingly insatiable desire for sports programming.
Correspondingly, as the demand for sporting events on television
increases, with the supply remaining relatively constant,1 the price
the television industry is willing to pay for sports programming has
skyrocketed.
As an outgrowth of the large sums of money involved in the
television packaging of sporting events, many legal battles have
surfaced. These battles often turn on the intricacies of an ever ad-
* Visiting Professor, St. Thomas University. University of Miami School of Law (J.D.,
1984). The authors wish to thank Mark Savercool for his. energy and expertise in researching
this article.
** Legal Department, Paramount Pictures Corporation. Florida State University Col-
lege of Law (J.D., 1982).
1. In recent years there have been many attempts to increase the supply of available
sport programming through the creation of the World Football League, the United States
Football League, and now even the United States Basketball League. However, it remains to
be seen what is the consumer's limit to sports programming.
2. In 1962, the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) paid the National Football
League (NFL) $4.6 million for the year and the American Broadcasting Company (ABC)
paid the American Football League (AFL) $1.9 million. During that year, the National
Broadcasting Company (NBC) did not have a professional football contract. In 1985, it was
estimated that each team in the NFL received $16 million from television revenues. Addi-
tionally, with the breakup of the NCAA's exclusive right to bargain for all member colleges,
independent institutions like the University of Miami have been able to separately contract
with the networks for approximately $2.5 million a year. See Hochberg and Horowitz,
Broadcasting and CATV: The Beauty and the Bane of Major College Football, 38 LAw &
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 112 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Broadcasting and CATV]. See
also Cablesports, Vol. 3 No. 36, Nov. 4, 1985.
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vancing audiovisual technology, which must be governed by an in-
herently slow-to-change legal system." In the wake of this uncer-
tainty, several fundamental questions arise concerning the
property rights of owners in the sporting events they produce.
These questions include the following: (1) What authority do the
leagues have in granting television rights to their games, both in
the national and/or the local marketplace? and (2) What are the
rights of the superstations4 to ultimately distribute games?
In an attempt to resolve these questions, focusing specifically
upon the superstation issue as it effects professional baseball, it is
necessary to explore the nature of these property rights from the
following perspectives: (1) the broadcasting rights and the copy-
rights which surround sports programming; (2) the technology
which allows sports programming to reach its different markets; (3)
the specific problems entangled with superstation broadcasts and
their relationship to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal; and (4) how
the future of the television and sports industries will evolve.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CABLE COPYRIGHT IN THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES
The first sporting event ever televised was a college baseball
game between Columbia and Princeton in 1939. 5 From these sim-
ple beginnings have emerged such intricate and complex technolo-
gies as the world wide closed circuit satellite distribution of major
sporting events. In the intervening years it has become very un-
clear as to who owns exactly what rights when dealing with the
broadcast of a sporting event. Traditionally, the law has granted
certain property rights both in the sporting event itself and in the
public performance or broadcast of that event via radio, television,
satellite, and cable. Only through a clear establishment of these
bundles of rights is it possible to sell the programs on the open
market.
3. Over the years, Congress has passed several pieces of legislation governing the
sports broadcasting industry, including: The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1962, 15 U.S.C. §§
1291-95 (1962), the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 USC § 1, and the Communications Policy Act
of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 601-05 (1984). Beyond these statutes, it is important to realize that
sports broadcasting is governed by a complex mixture of governmental bodies including the
Federal Communication Commission (FCC), the Copyright Office, the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal (CRT), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Justice Department.
4. "Superstation" is a term of art used to describe a "local" independent over-the-air
broadcast television station which has its signal transmitted via satellite to cable operators
across the country, thus creating a national audience for a local station (with a technologi-
cally "super-powerful signal").
5. See Garrett and Hochberg, Sports Broadcasting and the Law, 59 IND. L. J. 155
(1984).
[Vol. 3:35
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From as early as 1938, the courts have explained that the own-
ers of sports franchises have a property right in the games they
promote. The owners may legally restrict dissemination of news
(play-by-play commentary) from those games, since they have cre-
ated the ball games and are in control of the parks they are played
in either by ownership or lease. Since the 1930's, many courts
have reinforced this property broadcast right or the right of public-
ity vested in the creator of a sporting event,7 balanced always by
the media's constitutional right to free speech.'
A) Copyright Protection
As the right of publicity slowly evolved out of the common
law, it became apparent that something more specific was needed
to adequately protect these intangible pieces of property. As a re-
sult, the courts began to recognize the presence of a copyright in
sporting events and the broadcasts. 9 Copyright is most simply de-
fined as a legal monopoly over a creative work, of limited scope
and duration, under the terms of which the creator may control
the exploitation of the work.10
This limited monopoly has its origin in our most fundamental
legal doctrine, the United States Constitution, which empowers
Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and the Useful
Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the
Exclusive Right to their respective writings and Discoveries.""
Pursuant to this power, Congress passed a federal statute"'
governing copyright. Under the federal statute, any original work
of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression, (recorded
for a suitable duration), is copyrightable.' 3 A copyright may be
granted for literary works, musical works, dramatic works, pic-
6. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
7. See e.g., Radio Corp. v. Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc., 97 F. 2d 223 (7th Cir.
1938).
8. Under the courts' interpretation of the United States Constitution, the media has a
constitutional right to report newsworthy aspects (limited clips or highlights) of a sporting
event to the public once the event is finished. The media has tried to expand this right to
access, but the courts have continually supported the owners' absolute right of publicity in a
sporting event. See Post Newsweek Stations, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 81 (D.
Conn. 1981).
9. Radio Corp., 97 F.2d at 223.
10. See Ladd, Schrader, Leibowitz and Oler, Copyright, Cable, The Compulsory Li-
cense: A Second Chance, COMM. AND L. 7 (1981).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (first passed in 1905 and revised in 1976).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
19861
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tures, sound recording, motion pictures and other audiovisual
works.14 Once a copyright is established, the owner has the exclu-
sive right to authorize any reproduction of the work, to distribute
copies of the work, and control any new works which are born out
of or derived from the original piece.'6 Furthermore, in terms of
motion pictures or audiovisual works, such as television, the copy-
right owner has the right to control any public performance of that
work, including any broadcast transmission.1 6
In terms of application to the sports industries, a sporting
event is fixed when it is recorded. The recording, including both
audio and video, may occur simultaneously with transmission, and
is at that time protected. 17 Therefore, when an owner creates a
game or event, the copyright is vested exclusively therein,'8 and
any public performance or broadcast of the game from the stadium
to the viewer is within the complete control of the copyright owner.
In the establishment and growth of any professional sports
league, it is the pooling by the separate franchise owners of these
rights which forms the league's internal framework. Major League
Baseball (MLB), like many other professional leagues, is composed
of an agreement whereby the owners have decided to pool their
copyrights to every game played and then collectively, through
their commissioner, sell those rights in the marketplace. 19
Currently, the MLB owner's collective copyright or broadcast
policy is to market the rights to the national distribution of MLB
games as a complete package, while each independent franchise re-
tains the copyright in, and therefore the right to sell, the local dis-
tribution to the home market or area of dominant influence (ADI),
for every game that the club plays.10 Under the MLB owner's
14. Id.
15. Id. at § 106 (1976).
16. Id. at § 106(4) (1976).
17. Id. at § 102 (1976).
18. Id. at § 106 (1976). It is interesting to note that the players have tried to assert
that they have property rights in the games and broadcasts. Their argument is very weak,
and no court has yet supported it. See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Players Association, No. 82 C 3710 (N.D. Ill. filed June 14, 1982). For a more detailed dis-
cussion, see Garrett and Hochberg, supra note 5, at 165.
19. Though this article will focus specifically on the problems surrounding cable copy-
right as it applies to Major League Baseball, these issues and arguments are directly analo-
gous to all the professional sports leagues.
20. See Copyright Royalty Fees For Cable Systems, Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the
Judiciary House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 394 (1984). (Written
Memorandum of Robert W. Ross, General Counsel for Turner Broadcasting Systems) [here-
inafter cited as Copyright Royalty Fees]. The national broadcast contract for MLB is with
[Vol. 3:35
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agreement, this broadcast policy can only change by fifty percent
of the owners in each league. 1
There are several technological avenues by which a league may
distribute its copyrights into the television marketplace. Basically
there are five means of locally distributing television signals be-
yond the traditional over-the-air broadcasts: Community Antenna
Television (CATV or Cable), Subscription Television (STV), Mul-
tipoint Distribution Service (MDS), Direct Broadcast Satellites
(DBS), and Home-Television Receive Only (TVRO's or Earth Sta-
tions).2 2 These local distributors of television signals are supplied
programs by four different types of technologies. First, there are
national satellite networks like USA or ESPN, which are usually
found on basic cable service.23 Second, a growing number of re-
gional satellite networks have developed, such as the Sports Chan-
nel, Dodgervision, and New England Sports Channel, which re-
quire a special fee called expanded basic. 24 Next, there are
premium channels, like HBO and ON-TV, where a special fee is
charged for each network subscribed to by the viewer.2" And fi-
nally, there are superstations, a network which combines an in-
dependant over-the-air station's broadcasts with national satellite
two networks, American Broadcasting Company and National Broadcasting Company, and
includes national satellite-to-cable coverage of any MLB games. The six year contract (1984-
89) is worth a total of 1.21 billion dollars, with payments rising on an annual basis from
$160 million in 1984 to $240 million in 1989. Additionally, the sum of individual franchise
sales of local broadcast rights adds up to over $100 million annually. QV PUBLISHING, INC.,
TELEVISION SPORTS RIGHTS II at 13-33 (1986).
21. This may turn out to be very significant since up until last year the owners re-
quired a 75% vote before the broadcast policy could change.
22. For a more detailed explanation of these technologies, see Crane and Cryan, Tele-
communication Pirates - America's Newest Criminals?, 2 ENr. SP. L. J. 167, 167-70 (1985)
and Miller, Satellite Transmissions: The Laws and Policies That Affect the Programmers,
Individual Earth Stations and SMATV (Private Cable) Owners, 2 ENr. SP. L. J. 33, 33-37
(1984).
23. Television signals today are most economically transmitted via a satellite in ge-
osynchronous or geo-stationary orbit 22,300 miles above the earth. The program supplier
transmits a narrow signal up to the satellite, known as the up-link, the signal is received by
the satellite and redirected back to earth, literally spraying it across the country. The area
of coverage of this spray is known as the footprint. The local cable franchise, or down-link,
picks up the signal with a dish antenna and distributes it to the community. For more
details see, Cryan and Crane, International Telecommunications Pirates: Protecting Amer-
ican Satellite Signals Abroad, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. AM POL. 851 (1985). Basic Cable is a
collection of national satellite program suppliers which a cable. customer receives for a fiat
monthly fee, usually consisting of CNN, USA, ESPN, and a superstation.
24. Expanded basic requires an additional fee above the monthly charge for basic and
usually includes a regional sports network.
25. Pay television is a term of art, including basic, expanded basic, and premium
channels used to describe the service where the consumer pays a fee to receive special satel-
lite programs no matter what form the local distribution takes.
1986]
5
Cryan and Crane: Sports on the Superstations: The Legal and Economic Effects
Published by Institutional Repository, 1986
40 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
distribution of that local signal.
B) Cable Copyright and the Superstations
When a traditional national satellite distributor of program-
ming, like ESPN, puts its property in the marketplace, it gets paid
directly from the local distributor for its shows. When a supersta-
tion, however, has its programming delivered via satellite nation-
ally, there is no payment made by the local distributor for the
right to publicly broadcast the station locally.26 There is no direct
payment to the superstation because it is not responsible for the
national distribution of the programming.27 The local independent
over-the-air station, or first half of the superstation matrix, broad-
casts the event publicly over-the-air in their ADI; then another
company completely independent of the superstation, picks up the
over-the-air signal, transmits it up to a satellite which in turn re-
distributes the signal nationally; local satellite distributors pick up
the signal and offer it as part of their basic package to their sub-
scribers, thereby making up the second half of the superstation
enterprise.
The problem begins to emerge when it is debated what consti-
tutes a public performance of the underlying copyrighted work, for
example a baseball game. As a local over-the-air television station,
the superstation pays a copyright fee to publicly perform the work
in their local ADI, which reflects the size of the viewing audience
in that city. When the copyrighted work is distributed nationally
into several million television homes without the control or consent
of the independent station, that station cannot be legally responsi-
ble for the copyright infringement which occurs when more people
than contracted for are viewing the re-publication of the protected
work. In fact, it is the copyright statute which allows this to hap-
pen. The statute stipulates that a secondary transmission (the sat-
ellite up-link of the over-the-air signal in the superstation exam-
ple) of a primary transmission (the local television over-the-air
broadcast of the programs) is exempt from copyright liability if the
secondary transmission is simply a relaying of the signal in its en-
tirety by one with no direct or indirect control or influence upon
the over-the-air signal.2 8
Because the law allows the signal to be distributed nationally
with the copyright fee only reflective of the local ADI distribution,
26. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19, at 395.
27. Id. at 397.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a) (1976).
[Vol. 3:35
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the statute provides for the copyright holder to be compensated for
this unsanctioned national distribution.29 The statute stipulates
that when a local over-the-air television signal is distributed na-
tionally via satellite, the local cable distributor who receives and
distributes to its customers this "distant signal,"' must pay a stat-
utory compulsory license fee.3 1 The copyright act grants these re-
sponsibilities to an independent body, not a part of the copyright
office, called the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT). 2 The CRT
collects the fees and decides what copyright holders have had their
works distributed nationally via these superstations and, in turn,
pays those copyright holders for the national exposure of their
product. The manner in which the fee is calculated is very compli-
cated. Originally, a cable system would pay a small percentage
(.675%) of gross receipts for every secondary transmission (pump-
ing down the cable to the viewer) of any non-network (i.e. non -
ABC, NBC, and CBS) distant signal program."3
In 1982, approximately 6,200 cable systems paid a total of
forty million dollars in compulsory licensing royalty for an average
of about $6,500 per cable system.3 4 Of the forty million dollars re-
ceived by the CRT, the greatest share, almost seventy-five percent,
was distributed to the Motion Picture Association and other pro-
gram syndicates.3 The next largest share, fifteen percent or about
six million dollars, went to the sports industries. 6
Because the original fee was relatively low, many of the copy-
right holders sought adequate compensation for their copyrighted
work. Ultimately, that vehicle became the courts.
The landmark case covering the issue is Eastern Microwave,
Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc.7 Doubleday, as the owner of the
New York Mets, had the right to the local broadcast of all Mets
games in New York City. Doubleday contracted with a local inde-
pendent, station in New York, WOR-TV, to broadcast the Mets
29. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976).
30. Distant signal is a term which refers to the local distribution of programming net-
works which do not originate locally. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and
the copyright office directly and indirectly regulate the number of distant signals allowed to
be distributed by local cable companies in an effort to ensure the accessability of local pro-
gramming to the community.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19, at 284.
35. See Ladd, supra note 10, at 17.
36. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19, at 292.
37. 691 F. 2d. 125 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1232 (1983).
19861
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games locally. During the term of the contract, Eastern Microwave,
Inc. (EMI), a satellite relay carrier, began picking up WOR's signal
off-the-air and distributing it via satellite across the nation without
WOR's permission. EMI would then sell the signal to local cable
companies for a moderate fee (never more than $3,000 per year).
The local cable company could then pump WOR's signal down the
cable and, in addition to the fee paid to EMI, only pay the inex-
pensive compulsory license fee to the CRT. This would allow local
cable companies to give their subscribers over 100 Mets games a
year for a cost far less than the money that they were receiving
from subscriber revenues. Therefore, the Mets games were being
distributed nationally, and Doubleday was receiving only a copy-
right royalty from WOR which reflected WOR's over-the-air
broadcast in New York City, plus the CRT disbursement. This fee
was supposed to compensate for the additional national cable dis-
tribution, but in reality, was far short of what the national cable
market exposure was worth.
Doubleday made several arguments in the case, asking that
EMI be stopped from distributing Mets games nationally, but the
court found that EMI was within the scope of the statute and that
the system, theoretically, justly compensated Doubleday for its
copyright. The superstation was legally placed into a loophole
which allowed them to reap the benefits of national distribution
(the ability to sell national advertising time) while paying the
copyright cost for programming based solely on the over-the-air
exposure in its local market. 8
Because the dollar value of the compulsory license was a rela-
tively low figure for the amount of programming being exposed to
a national audience, the CRT increased the fee. The new rate es-
tablished was 3.75 percent of basic receipts for each superstation
carried.89
This rate increase took place on March 15, 1983, and was
known as "Black Thursday" for it increased by four to sixteen
times the existing copyright royalty fees cable systems were re-
quired to pay for the right to locally distribute those distant sig-
nals.40 In response, many cable franchises felt that the fee was too
much to pay to the copyright office, so many franchises took one or
more of the superstations off their basic service and replaced it
with cheaper programming. The National Cable Television Associ-
38. 691 F.2d at 126-27.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (1976).
40. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19, at 259.
[Vol. 3:35
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ation (NCTA) found that as many as nineteen million Americans
may have lost service as a result of the CRT's rate increase.41 Nev-
ertheless, many sides are now upset. The copyright holders, even
with the rate increase, still feel that their compensation is substan-
tially less than adequate for the national distribution of a pro-
tected work. The cable distributors feel that the fee is too high for
the programming they receive, and the fans are angry because they
have either lost their access to the games, or now must pay more
for the games they receive. These are just the surface problems.
Beyond these issues, however, it is necessary to address some of
the industry arguments and their repercussions.
II. INDUSTRY PROBLEMS WITH THE SUPERSTATIONS
Having discussed issues that surround superstation delivery of
distant signals into local markets, it is important to now examine
the economic and practical by-products of this intricate anomaly.
Realizing that the owners in MLB have collectively retained the
right to the local broadcasts of their teams' games, and that they
freely sell those rights on the open market in their respective cit-
ies, it is understandable that a team would choose to sell its local
game rights to a local station which though beyond their control,
broadcasts those games nationally. From a pure economic point of
view, even if the team owner is not getting a better contract in
terms of dollars from the station itself, at least theoretically the
owner should be indemnified by the CRT. Moreover, the national
exposure can only increase the value of the team.42 Ultimately,
there is nothing to stop an MLB team from going to the bargaining
table with their flagship superstation and demanding more dollars
for its copyrighted games. Logically these games are distributed
nationally by the superstation, and regardless of the nominal mon-
ies they may receive from the CRT, the team is entitled to a larger
fee which should be in accordance with the financial benefits the
superstations are receiving, via their advertisers, for the national
distribution of their signal.4
41. See id. at 353.
42. Currently there are five superstations: WOR, WGN, WTBS, WPIX and KMGE,
with another four already licensed for operation. Of the five in existence, all are flagship
stations for an MLB team and two have cross-ownership interests. Of the four to come on
line in the future, all are flagship stations for an MLB team with two having cross-
ownership.
43. This issue has been complicated by the argument that there are two types of
superstations: active and passive. An active superstation is a local independent, like WTBS,
which vigorously pursues the marketing of its signal on a national scale, always pressing for
1986]
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Even though the five franchises affiliated with superstations
have received criticism from other MLB owners for undermining
their home marketplaces, the owners have willfully entered into
contracts with their flagship-superstations. In addition, four addi-
tional teams will shortly be on a flagship superstation voluntarily.
Therefore, it now becomes important to examine the arguments
the league itself has made through its commissioner concerning the
superstation issues.
The commissioner's office has opposed the compulsory licens-
ing provisions of the Copyright Act since its inception."" In opposi-
tion to superstations, the commissioner's office has put forth sev-
eral arguments, including that the importation of distant signals
into a local cable market, which is the home of another MLB
franchise, erodes fan loyalty to that home team. This erosion has
two aspects. First, that home attendance has dropped and second,
that local viewership of the home franchise on its local channel
also drops. As a result, those flagship stations, theoretically, lose
advertising dollars and accordingly would pay less to the local
franchise owner for the local distribution rights. Another argument
put forth by the commissioner is a purely legal one, which simply
asserts that the entire cable copyright process, including the estab-
lishment of the CRT, constitutes an outright taking or expropria-
tion of MLB's property or copyright.
A) Superstation Effect on Attendance
Since the beginning of superstation broadcasts, the commis-
sioner has argued that superstation penetration into distant mar-
kets has negatively affected gate attendance at local franchise
games. The problem with this argument lies in the lack of support-
ing evidence. The yearly gate attendance of any MLB club is a
function of a number of variable elements, including the existence
of a popular superstar, the availability of other competing leisure
time activities to compete for the limited entertainment dollar in
the city, the size and quality of the team's marketing program and,
probably most importantly, the team's performance. Just which
greater and greater national advertisements. A passive superstation, like WGN, accepts the
position that it has no control of the fact that its signal is distributed nationally, and there-
fore it looks to sell only local advertisements and considers itself a victim of circumstance.
44. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19, at 378. Note that beyond the copy-
right issue the commission has requested that a fifty mile blackout of retransmissions of
broadcast sporting events by cable systems located in a professional sports franchise local
market be added to the local cable transmission as well as its existing restrictions for over-
the-air broadcasts.
[Vol. 3:35
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factor is most responsible for a drop in attendance at any given
point in time is almost impossible to say. To make the assertion
that superstation penetration is an over-riding influence is
unsupportable.
In attempting to determine just how influential a superstation
is upon a home team's attendance, it is important to first decide
how much attendance is predicated upon team performance. Table
1 below, includes each team's average standing in its division over
a five year period along with its average attendance for the same
period. The only two teams which did not follow the standard of
the better the performance, the better the attendance, were the
Baltimore Orioles and the Pittsburgh Pirates, who ranked first and
second in the standings respectively, while each placed fifth in at-
tendance in its division during the same period." Overall, the
teams with the best records were on top for attendance, teams with
poor records were on the bottom, and all others were in the middle
for attendance.46
TABLE 147
COL. I COL. 2 COL. 3 COL. 4
Average Rank Average Rank
TEAM Standing Attendance
NATIONAL LEAGUE EAST
Philadelphia Phillies 1.8 1 2,502,957 1
Pittsburgh Pirates 2.4 2 1,259,268 5
Montreal Expos 2.8 3 2,075,260 2
St. Louis Cardinals 3.4 4 1,744,088 3
Chicago Cubs 4.8 5 1,421,934 4
New York Mets 5.8 6 1,084,823 6
NATIONAL LEAGUE WEST
Los Angeles Dodgers 1.8 1 3,315,456 1
Houston Astros 3.2 2 1,643,038 3
Cincinnati Reds 3.6 3 1,885,765 2
Atlanta Braves 3.8 4 1,328,858 6
San Francisco Giants 4.0 5 1,349,094 5
San Diego Padres 4.6 6 1,482,686 4
45. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19, at 380. Note, the low attendance even
with the good performance by Baltimore and Pittsburgh may have been caused by stadium
location, ticket price, weather, or availability of parking, in addition to the possible reasons
mentioned above.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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COL. 1 COL. 2 COL. 3 COL. 4
Average Rank Average Rank
TEAM Standing Attendance
AMERICAN LEAGUE EAST
Baltimore Orioles 2.0 1 1,637,050 5
New York Yankees 2.8 2 2,360,050 1
Milwaukee Brewers 2.8 2 1,950,637 3
Boston Red Sox 3.6 4 2,072,452 2
Detroit Tigers 4.2 5 1,719,362 4
Toronto Bluejays 6.2 6 1,520,167 6
Cleveland Indians 6.2 7 931,808 7
AMERICAN LEAGUE WEST
Kansas City Royals 1.6 1 2,210,878 2
California Angels 3.2 2 2,387,733 1
Texas Rangers 3.6 3 1,336,743 4
Chicago White Sox 3.8 4 1,534,555 3
Minnesota Twins 4.6 5 881,546 7
Oakland A's 4.8 6 941,290 5
Seattle Mariners 6.2 7 888,406 6
After discussing the effect that performance has on gate at-
tendance, it is important to analyze the fluctuation in attendance
that occurs at home games during the importation by cable sys-
tems of distant games via superstation signals. Table 2 below, com-
pares total attendance for a two month period in 1983 for home
games played by MLB clubs"5 simultaneously with WTBS-Atlanta
Braves broadcasts into those distant markets, and for home games
played at a time when no simultaneous Braves games were broad-
cast into the local market. The statistics show that gate attendance
was actually slightly higher when Braves games were simultane-
ously available on cable in the local market.49 In reading the table,
it is important to note that these statistics are league-wide and
that some teams' attendance for the period was lower when Braves
games were simultaneously broadcast.50 Whether this was caused
by the importation of Braves games or any combination of factors
is difficult to say, but an examination of the league-wide statistics
demonstrates that if there is any negative effect at all, it appears
relatively minor.
48. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19, at 380. Note, this data was compiled
by Turner Broadcasting System, the owners of the Atlanta Braves. The data reflects home
gate attendance during June and July of 1983 for 23 major league clubs. The Expos and the
Blue Jays were left off because they served Canadian markets; the Braves were omitted
because WTBS is their flagship station. June and July were selected to minimize the effect
of the pennant race and the standings upon attendance.
49. Id. at 382.
50. Id. at 383.
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TABLE 2
Simultaneous
WTBS/Braves
Broadcast
No Simultaneous
WTBS/Braves
Broadcast
COL. 2 COL. 3
# Average
Games Attendance
COL. 4
Total
Attendance
COL. 5 COL. 6
# Average
Games Attendance
American
League
National
League
Both
Leagues
12 Bottom
Teams
10 Smallest
Metro Areas
Intersection
of Bottom
Teams and
Smallest
Areas
4,717,763 196 24,070
4,771,828 186 25,655
9,489,591 382 24,842
4,465,894 205 21,785
3,729,698 172 21,684
2,515,243 125 20,122
3,925,018 166 23,645
2,281,841 96 23,769
6,206,859 262 23,690
3,012,261 142 21,213
2,172,449 109 19,931
1,490,965 81 18,407
B) Superstation Effect on Local Television Revenues
The next component of the commissioner's argument is that
superstation distant signal importation adversely impacts an MLB
club's revenue derived from the sale of team copyrights in the local
broadcast of club games. Again, it is difficult to prove that any sin-
gle variable has a substantial impact on a local broadcast rights
contract, which may be influenced by any number of variables, in-
cluding team performance or superstars. An examination of the
overall trend in television packages for MLB over the past five
years indicates that there has been an enormous rise in television
revenue for MLB, far surpassing the rate of inflation. Thus, it
would be difficult to establish that MLB television contracts have
suffered from superstations.
COL. 1
Total
Attendance
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TABLE 368
TOTAL TV % NET- % LOCAL TV %
WORK[52
1
YEAR REVENUE INC. REVENUE INC. REVENUE INC.
1984 268,000,000 75% 160,000,000 193% 104,950,000 11%
1983 152,710,000 29% .54,500,000 9% 94,710,000 46%
1982 118,350,000 32% 50,000,000 59% 64,950,000 34%
1981 89,525,000 12% 31,500,000 48,400,000 25%
1980 80,275,000 11% 38,700,000 24%
1979 54,500,000 47% 31,225,000
Table 3 above shows the annual increase in revenue from the
sale of both national and local television rights. In the recorded
time period, local television income has averaged a twenty-eight
percent increase yearly.
In order to place these dollar figures in perspective with the
league and the team totals, it is necessary to realize that in 1985
MLB received a total television package of over $275 million. 3 Of
the approximately $105 million received for local broadcast rights,
the dollar figures vary greatly from team to team." For example,
the Seattle Mariners receive $1,400,000 a year for their local broad-
cast rights while the Philadelphia Phillies receive $8,000,000, and
neither of these two teams are affiliated with a superstation.
Teams that were affiliated with superstations, for the most part,
had larger local rights contracts than teams which were not. The
best examples are the New York Yankees and the New York Mets;
51. Id. at 384.
52. This excludes pay television, radio revenues, etc.
53. See Sobel, Baseball Rights Fees in 1985 to Remain at $275 million, Television/
Radio Age, Vol. 22, No. 16, Feb. 18, 1985 at 31.
54.
LOCAL TV REVENUES IN MLB
TEAM 1984 RIGHTS
American League East
Baltimore Orioles $ 3,500,000
Boston Red Sox 3,400,000
Cleveland Indians 3,400,000
Detroit Tigers 2,700,000
Milwaukee Brewers 3,250,000
New York Yankees 11,700,000
Toronto Blue Jays 5,000,000
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these teams received $11,700,000 and $10,900,000 respectively, for
their local copyrights.5 5 Maybe the most interesting statistic is the
royalty fee the Atlanta Braves received for the sale of their local
right to WTBS, which amounted to only $2,100,000 lowest of any
superstation affiliated club. This relationship is simply an aca-
demic note of interest because Ted Turner is the owner of both
WTBS and the Braves, and thus, the royalty fee may not represent
a fsir market price.
In the final analysis, the argument that superstations nega-
tively impact local television revenues is difficult to support and,
even if true, would be difficult to justify changing the existing
structure. If superstations are legal, then let those who can create a
American League West
California Angels 4,000,000
Chicago White Sox 4,000,000
Kansas City Royals 1,800,000
Minnesota Twins 1,500,000
Oakland A's 2,000,000
Seattle Mariners 1,400,000
Texas Rangers 5,500,000
National League East
Chicago Cubs 3,600,000
Montreal Expos 7,500,000
New York Mets 10,900,000
Philadelphia Phillies 8,000,000
Pittsburgh Pirates 3,000,000
St. Louis Cardinals 2,600,000
National League West
Atlanta Braves 2,100,000
Cincinnati Reds 2,300,000
Houston Astros 3,100,000
Los Angeles Dodgers 3,500,000
San Diego Padres 2,400,000
San Francisco Giants 2,500,000
AL total $53,150,000
NL total $51,800,000
Majors total $104,950,000
Not included in the table are network payments for nationally broadcast games that total
about $163 million: ABC-TV, $85 million; NBC-TV, $75 million; and CBS Radio, about $3
million.
See Broadcasting, Feb. 27, 1984, at 47.
55. Even though the franchises affiliated with superstations are generally receiving the
largest dollar contracts, they are still asserting that for national distribution of their prod-
uct, they are underpaid.
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contract in their best interest flourish.56 However, this tension is
complicated by the many owners who are convinced that supersta-
tions do in fact erode their marketplace, and if all the owners are
financially forced to affiliate with a superstation, the saturation of
baseball games into the national market would be so great that the
game's aggregate value would plummet.
C) Superstations - A Taking of Property
In the past, the commissioner has put forth the argument that
superstations, by their very nature, legally steal MLB property,
and that this taking must be rectified. Unquestionably, the
courts, including an implied affirmation by the United States Su-
preme Court, 5 have found the cable copyright provisions valid as
they apply to superstations. Therefore, the statute is valid until
Congress sees fit to change it. The MLB owners, having exhausted
their remedies in the courts, have tried to persuade Congress to
change the law in a manner more protective of baseball's rights.5'
As of today, the law has not changed, and MLB's argument that
there has been a taking of property is still without legal founda-
tion. Assessing this situation, MLB's new commissioner, Peter
Ueberroth, has looked for other solutions to these many faceted
problems facing the league.
D) Ueberroth's Business Solution
As the commissioner's office began to assess the superstation
dilemma, several key issues became clear. First, the courts were
not going to offer any relief under the existing law. Second, Con-
gress appears to be open to change, but traditionally the legislature
is not quick to take action. So, the commissioner had to look else-
where, and the only avenue left was to go to the marketplace.60
It appeared that MLB had two alternatives to get appropriate
56. Beyond these statistics, the FCC did a three year study and published a report in
1980 on the issue of whether importation of superstation distant signals fractionalized local
television audiences and revenues. See Reports in 71 F.C.C. 2d 632; 71 F.C.C. 2d 951 (1979);
Report and Order Docket 79 F.C.C. 2d 663 (1980). Basically these reports rejected the argu-
ment that superstations negatively affect local television. In fact the study asserts that
weather and team performance are the major influences upon attendance and that television
has no appreciable impact.
57. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19, at 393.
58. See supra note 35.
59. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19, at 393 (former Commissioner Bowie
Kuhn's statement).
60. Id.
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revenue: either to continue to lobby Congress for a change in the
statute and/or to lobby the owners to change their broadcast policy
which grants local broadcast rights to each franchise. The possibil-
ity existed that the commissioner's office could force a new broad-
cast policy, one that would either pool all local broadcast rights in
addition to the national rights,61 and/or one which would limit the
number of games each team may sell for local distribution.6 2 As-
suming that these were the bargaining chips taken to the table,
MLB was able to sign an agreement with all five operating super-
stations to additionally compensate the league for the inadequate
copyright royalties which it was receiving from the CRT under the
statutory compulsory license, and to pay for the damage caused by
the importation of superstation distant signals to club franchise
home markets (the decline in attendance and local television reve-
nues). The total package to MLB from the five superstations is
estimated at approximately fifteen million dollars per year for the
next five years or about an additional $575,000 dollars to each
team per year.s The manner in which the additional fees were de-
rived between MLB and the superstations is a complex formula
which includes taking into account the number of games broadcast
and the number of homes the superstation was wired to outside its
local market. In simple terms, it might be expressed as each super-
station paying approximately fifteen to twenty cents per subscriber
per year64 in exchange for the following: (1) The right to locally
broadcast MLB games which will be distributed via satellite; (2)
To be contractually free from future lobbying by MLB for a legis-
lative change in the Copyright Act; (3) To be free from a change in
61. See infra notes 73 and 74 and accompanying text.
62. See Craig, TV Superstation Crisis Is Unresolved, The Sporting News, February
11, 1985, at 14. The National Basketball Association, faced with the same superstation
problems as MLB, by owner's agreement, put a ceiling on the number of local telecasts each
franchise could sell; ultimately reducing the number of basketball games seen nationally. To
clearly see the potential damage of such action to a superstation, consider WTBS's situa-
tion: WTBS receives approximately $225,000 in advertising revenue per game and currently
broadcasts 143 MLB games per year. If the owners reduced that to 100 games per year,
WTBS could lose $9.7 million. This is far more than the additional fees (five million dollars)
which Turner ultimately agreed to pay MLB. See Tasaffe, He Spent A Lot to Save A Lot
More, SPORTS ILLusTmAT, Feb. 11, 1985, at 168.
63. Note that by adding all television and radio monies together, each MLB team
averages about $11 million a year in broadcast revenues, not including pay television, gate
attendance or concessions. With the average MLB player salary at $289,194 per year this
means that a team's salary costs are approximately $5,800,000 per year, thus leaving a fair
profit margin once all the revenue and costs are computed in. See Copyright Royalty Fees,
supra note 19, at 343.
64. See TV Superstation Crisis, supra note 59, at 14.
1986]
17
Cryan and Crane: Sports on the Superstations: The Legal and Economic Effects
Published by Institutional Repository, 1986
52 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
the owner's broadcast agreement which would affect the number of
games to be locally televised; and (4) To be free from the pursuit
of judicial remedies by the commissioner (all for five years).15
III. TOWARDS THE FUTURE
As MLB and the entire sports industry look to the future, it
becomes increasingly apparent that the interrelationship between
sports and broadcasting can only grow more intertwined. In terms
of a long range solution to the superstation problem, the most
dominant proposal heard throughout the industry is to abandon
the CRT. If the CRT is dissolved, then the superstations and the
copyrighted holders, including MLB and its individual owners, will
be able to openly contract for a royalty fee which will reflect the
fact that the superstation signal is distributing the copyrighted
work nationally.6 Though Congress is currently considering two
bills to change the CRT and there is also talk about removing the
CRT, no action has yet been taken.67
Another alternative to the copyright problems with supersta-
tions is, rather than abolishing the CRT and allowing for a pure
marketplace solution, to form a private collection society to negoti-
ate a free market fee with the cable systems for the retransmission
of copyrighted works on the superstations. Just such a collection
organization has emerged in Europe as an answer to this tricky
problem of copyright liability due to retransmission of distant sig-
65. It is interesting to note that Turner might have had other considerations weighing
upon him which helped promote an accord with MLB. Specifically, Turner Broadcasting
Systems is a communications giant which is involved in many financial pursuits of which the
Atlanta Braves are a small part. In order for Turner to fund his company's growth, it is
necessary for him to raise investment capital, and to do this he must seek funds on the open
market. In fact in 1986, Turner is raising $200 million for his company through a stock
option plan and if WTBS was not on solid ground with MLB it would have become much
more difficult for him to raise that money. Therefore, the price Turner paid to MLB may
have indeed been less than it originally appeared. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note
19, at 99; TV Superstation Crisis, supra note 59, at 14.
66. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19, at 257. Most curious of all is the fact
that both sides of this issue would like a market place solution: (1) Sports copyright holders
want to negotiate with superstations without them asserting that they should pay a copy-
right fee only for local over-the-air distribution because the CRT will compensate the holder
for national distribution; and (2) the superstations want the CRT removed or changed be-
cause the compulsory license rate increase instituted by the CRT has theoretically forced
many cable systems to no longer carry their signals, thereby reducing their number of sub-
scribers, and in turn reducing the fees they can charge advertisers. Ultimately, it appears
that many superstations are being forced to pay copyright licensing fees that more closely
resemble national distribution, and thus, copyright holders are in essence, being paid
double.
67. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19.
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nals by cable systems.6 8 The Association de Gestion Internationale
Collective des Oeuvres Audiovisuelles, (AGICOA) 9 is a collective
management organization created to serve the needs of copyright
owners in the face of the demands of modern communications
technology. Specifically, AGICOA administers the representation
of rights from copyright owners (such as MLB) to users (cable sys-
tems) and the flow of royalty fees back to copyright holders where,
due to multitude of users and owners, it is very difficult to arrange
for individual licensing in advance of use.70 Essentially, AGICOA
operates as a private CRT. The major distinction, however, is that
AGICOA is not shackled by a fixed statutory licensing rate (for the
CRT it is 3.75% of gross cable revenues), but rather it is free to
negotiate in the marketplace any fee it can contractually secure."
In fact, AGICOA's first agreement came with the Belgian Cable
Operators and was negotiated at a royalty fee of fifteen percent of
the cable systems gross revenues."
If the copyright holders in the United States would pool their
simultaneous cable retransmission rights in such a manner, a simi-
larly created organization could supply the answer to the need for
compensation in a free market for valuable property. The system
would be unsuppressed by the artificial constraints of a compul-
sory license schene, while simultaneously managing the enormous
numbers of copyrighted works exposed to liability.7 s
Beyond these possible alternatives to the cable copyright di-
lemma, MLB has taken certain steps towards improving its bar-
gaining position within the broadcast industry. It is clear that the
commissioner has the authority to sell the television rights to the
World Series, the League Championship Series, the All-Star game
68. See Firestone, International Satellite and Cable Television, UCLA Communica-
tion Law Program 1985, at 393.
69. AGICOA, or Association for the International Collective Management of Audiovi-
sual Works, is a non-profit corporation through which copyright holders are compensated
for certain limited rights, enabling end users to negotiate for the use of copyrighted works
with one central clearinghouse. See AGICOA: Collective Management For Film Producers,
3 INT'L MEDIA LAW 106 (1985).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 107. Note, the mechanism by which the royalty fees collected by AGICOA
are in turn redistributed back to the copyright holders is a weighting formula based on the
length and category of each program, the time of day of the broadcast, and the broadcasting
source; the factors are computed to allocate the revenues equitably.
73. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see Cryan, Crane, and Marcil, The Fu-
ture of Sports Broadcasting: An International Question, 10 SrrON HALL LEG. J.
(1986).
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and the national distribution of regular season games.7 ' Moreover,
it is equally as clear that the sale of local broadcast rights is gov-
erned by the agreement among the franchise owners, wherein each
club is authorized to permit the telecast of its games over a broad-
cast station in its home market and to retain all proceeds from the
sale of these "open circuit" broadcast television rights. Further-
more, the agreement now provides that revenue derived from the
sale of games to "closed circuit" pay television must be pooled and
equally divided. 5 This has lead to the recent formation of MLB's
National Pay Television "Pooling" System.
A) MLB's Pay TV "Pooling" System
In December of 1983, MLB decided to pool the rights to the
pay television distribution of MLB games. Under the terms of the
owners' agreement, only an MLB club, in conjunction with its pay
television industry partner, usually a regional sports network
(Dodgervision), may import into its regional pay television cable
system telecasts of games of other MLB clubs. All local telecasts of
MLB games will be available in this pool and any game chosen
must be shown live or within twenty-four hours of its conclusion.
In order to use the pool, however, each club must offer their ser-
vice at a price tiered above basic cable. Therefore, the regional
sports channel must be on expanded basic or a premium channel.
This is necessary to insure that baseball games are not seen over-
the-air, thus protecting a flood of that marketplace.
This pooling mechanism allows the regional sports networks
which carry, for example, the Orioles, to show an Angels or White
Sox game when its pay service might otherwise be dark.7' This
type of owner's agreement is a direct force which advantageously
positions each individual franchise to enter the regional sports net-
work business. As a result, in 1986, nineteen of MLB's twenty-six
teams will have their games viewed on some form of a regional pay
television network.7 The amount of each club's investment in the
regional sports networks within its franchise area is unclear, but
74. It is interesting to note that MLB at one time sold national cable rights to the
USA Network for a number of games, but upon completion of that contract, it did not
renew with USA and rather sold those rights as part of the $163 million package to ABC
and NBC.
75. Because superstations are over-the-air broadcasters and they generate no revenue
from cable systems for receiving their signal, they are not obligated to share their proceeds
with the other clubs in the league. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19, at 396.
76. See Taaffe, The Dawn of A New Era, SPORTS ILLuSTRATrn, April 2, 1984, at 78.
77. See Copyright Royalty Fees, supra note 19, at 380.
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undoubtedly for MLB owners, the regional Pay television network
provides their newest source of revenue. Correspondingly, when an
owner has an interest in a pay television regional network and gate
attendance is down, it may not be as important because the gate
attendance in living room seats will be up and overall revenues will
theoretically continue to rise.
B) Pay-Per- View
All of these developments lead to one increasingly reccurring
thought: If some regular season games are on pay television today,
tomorrow there will be an increased number of regular season
games on pay television, and soon the championship games will be
seen only on pay television. Evidence of this development is the
current shift of Yankee games from WPIX, a superstation, to
Sports Channel, a regional pay television network.7 8
Theoretically, as this process evolves, only the away games of
a club will be on over-the-air television, because these broadcasts
will not adversely affect gate attendance. Later, the home games
will be placed on pay television under the assumption that the
franchise has now expanded its gate potential into living rooms
throughout its region of the country.79 Just how quickly this pro-
cess will develop is difficult to say. With the MLB contract expir-
ing in 1989, it is not too farfetched to imagine an entire network of
over-the-air and pay television broadcasts owned and operated by
MLB.80 Furthermore, with the National Football League (NFL)
contract coming due in 1988, a similar form of pay television distri-
bution for football is possible.
The next level of pay television above expanded basic is an
innovative concept known as Pay-Per-View (PPV). PPV allows a
subscriber hooked up to a cable system to independently contract
to view a particular event, like a World Series game, a boxing
match or even a regular season game. Using computer electronics,
the subscriber transmits a request to see the game via what is
called a two-way addressable cable system. The game is allowed to
flow along the cable to the subscriber's home and the event is
billed on the subscriber's monthly charge. This might very well be
the wave of the future, but PPV's downfall lies in the fact that
only twenty percent of all cable homes have two-way addressable
78. Id. at 391.
79. Id. at 291.
80. See Leavy, Baseball Making Plans For Pay-Cable TV Networks, Washington
Post, April 13, 1983, Section D, at 1.
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capability."'
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the manner in which the superstation issues are,
resolved, be it by modifying or dissolving the CRT or implement-
ing a private collection agency, the inexorable merger of sports and
broadcasting will not be slowed. While MLB continues to cry fi-
nancial woes in the wake of possible strikes by the players associa-
tion, the future for expanded revenues through regional sports net-
works and PPV systems appears likely.82 In fact, MLB might look
to the pooling of all television rights, national and local, as the
NFL does, and in turn equally distribute those funds to all teams
as a means of giving greater financial stability to all franchises and
to the league as a whole. 8 It might even be fair to say that soon all
television rights in MLB, both national and local, will be pooled
and a new network will appear on the scene." Until such time,
however, MLB and all professional sports must continue to solve
the problems surrounding broadcast rights and realize that the ar-
gument over the CRT and distant signals may soon fall away
under the possible development of a total sports television system.
81. See Klein, Sport Teams That Are Losing Their Bet That Fans Will Pay For TV
Events, The Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1985, at 37. However, a classic example of
the potential of this type of service occurred at the end of the 1985 baseball season as the
pennant races were heating up. The Meta were playing the Dodgers in Los Angeles, and
Dwight Gooden was facing Fernando Valenzuela in a pitchers duel. Dodger stadium was
sold out, but Dodgervision offered the game on its PPV system, where 14,000 homes had the
game tuned in.
82. See Pay-Per-View Update, Vol. 1, No. 16, Oct. 4, 1985, at 5.
83. In an effort to maintain greater financial stability the NFL shares almost 90% of
the leagues $720 million of annual revenue. This is done by: (1) Sharing all national televi-
sion income and all playoff revenues equally among the franchises; (2) Dividing all regular
season gate income by 60% to the home club and 40% to the visitors; and (3) Splitting pre-
season gate receipts 50-50. Possibly MLB could follow the NFL's system with some success.
See CABLESPORTS, Vol. 3, No. 36, Nov. 4, 1985, at 2.
84. If such an event did happen there might be antitrust problems which would have
to be addressed. See Hoffman, Pooling Of Local Broadcasting Income In The American
Baseball League - Antitrust and Constitutional Issues, 32 SYRAcusE LAW REV. 841 (1981).
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